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WHY are you in this war?
You are the English ; you are now, and will continue to be,
a great people. You are at present united, with the exception of a
few ineffective intellectuals, in a resolve to "crush" Germany, to
beat her to her knees, to punish her. Hate, when it permeates a
whole people, becomes a terrible political fact. Yet there is no
reason why neutrals should sanction and condone British hate any
more than German hate, or Mohammedan hate. Hate always blights,
never creates, and should hate rule the peace and the settlement,
whichever side wins in the field, we shall have a worse Europe than
before. It is not. therefore, to your half-crazed wartime mood that
I appeal, but to whatever measure of cool reason remains among
you. In every crisis a few Englishmen keep their heads ; that is
one of the sources of British strength. Let me ask them, without
rancor, one question.
What are you fighting for ?
You may say that the answer is simple ; you are fighting for
democracy, for liberty, for civilization, for humanity. Permit me
to point out that these vague phrases in themselves mean exactly
nothing. Each of the belligerents believes it is fighting for "civili-
zation." The idealism of the German people is as sincere, ilnd their
earnestness as intense, to say the least, as your own. High-sounding
pretensions must be translated into concrete terms to gain signifi-
cance.
An explanation would come from you in good grace. For, on
the face of it, your position in the war is peculiar. You are fighting
on the side of Russia, a despotic and half-Asiatic power which has
little in common with Western civilization, and whose interests are
in no way identical with those of the British Empire, and you are
fighting against Germany, a people of the same stock as yourselves,
with the same general social purposes, whom the deeper racial and
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cultural forces would seem to mark as your natural ally. Indeed,
your choice of sides in this struggle is a great historical anomaly,
second only to the anomaly of the war itself. How did that align-
ment come about? Of course there are reasons. But are the rea-
sons those which have been alleged by your statesmen and publicists ?
Behind this question lies another: What are you striving to accom-
plish in this conflict? What purposes do you hope to achieve by
that victory of which you are still so confident?
This is not an academic discussion. These are political ques-
tions of the greatest urgency, both for Englishmen, and indirectly,
for citizens of the United States. It is of the first importance that
we think rightly on these issues, not merely that we may save our
own souls by finding the truth, but that, having embraced the truth,
we may save Europe and the world.
II.
Are you fighting for Belgium?
You must admit that for many of the British public Belgium
was England's casus belli. Hundreds of thousands of your best
young men have enlisted in the service of the King, believing that
they are taking up arms to defend a little country against a brutal
aggression. From your press and platform have come the strongest
assertions that England is fighting a righteous war to vindicate the
sanctity of treaties and uphold the rights of small nations. No
consideration has won you sympathy in neutral countries more
readily than this plea.
Do you still insist on the pose of the knightly rescuer? Let
me call your attention to two or three incontrovertible aspects of
your relation to Belgium.
1. Sir Edward Grey had, in secret commitments, unconditionally
pledged the naval and military forces of the Empire to France in
case of a European war. These secret agreements, contracted as
far back as 1906 and frequently renewed, known to only a few
members of the Cabinet, were not announced to Parliament and the
British nation until August 3, 1914, when the armies of the Con-
tinent were already on the march. They would have thrown you
into war in any case, Belgium or no Belgium. It is said on good
authority that Sir Edward Grey planned, in event of repudiation by
his own Cabinet, to form a Coalition Cabinet in August 1914—as
was done months later—and proceed to carry out his "obligations
of honor." That these agreements were contracted in secret, with-
out the knowledge of the British people, does not alter the fact that
they were a binding action of the British government.
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2. Germany made a definite bid for your neutrality on the score
of Belgian integrity. If your Government had been actuated by
any idealistic concern for smaH nationalities why did it not intervene
to preserve Belgium when it could? Sir Edward Grey was asked
point blank by Ambassador Lichnowsky whether he would keep
Britain out of the war if Belgian neutrality were respected (cele-
brated dispatch No. 123, British White Paper). Your Foreign
Secretary answered, no, his hands must be free,—meaning, of
course, that his hands already were tied. When war came, Great
Britain's action was mortgaged. "If France became involved we
should be drawn in" (No. 111). England might have, indeed would
have, saved Belgium had Belgian welfare been a primary object of
British statesmanship; but it was not.
3. Belgium was used shamelessly as a pawn in the great game
between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, Your little
neighbor, by the accident of its position, is of the greatest strategic
importance, either for an offensive against France or an offensive
against Germany. Your Foreign Office urged the Belgians to "main-
tain to the utmost of their power their neutrality" (White Paper
No. 115). France pressed armed aid on Belgium before its course
was announced. British and French strategists for years had been
hatching secret military plans with the Belgian General Staff. These
plans did not, it is true, foreshadow direct aggression on Belgium,
but surely they indicated the most cynical willingness to use the
Belgian army as a first line of defense for the Entente. When war
broke out the "plucky Belgians" rendered you a most valuable ser-
vice in delaying the march of the Teutonic hosts. What, I ask you
in all frankness, did you do for Belgium ? Belgium was desolated
;
she was caught and ground to pieces between the huge rival alliances
of Europe. The action of your government, playing the game of
the balance of power, amounted to nothing less than a ghastly be-
trayal of Belgian interests.
The above observations, I submit, are based on facts ; I do not
admit that they are disputable. I give them thus briefly because
they have been emphasized already by many British writers. I
need mention only the names of Dr. F. C. Conybeare,^ E. D. Morel,-
H. N. Brailsford,^ Ramsay Macdonald,* and Bernard Shaw.^ Even
the London Times, in a leader of March 12j 1915, repudiated chiv-
* Conybeare, Letter in Vital Issue.
* Morel, Letter to Birkenhead Liberal Association.
* Brailsford, "Belgium as 'The Scrap of Paper.'
"
* Macdonald, Statement in the Labor Leader.
* Shaw, "Common Sense About the War."
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airy for Belgium: "Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is quite right.
Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor and interest would
have united us with France."
Yet I know what reply you, the better class of Englishmen,
would give to the foregoing. You would say : "This indictment of
the past is all very well. I dare say our statesmen juggled with
P)elgium, and I ha\e never been a partisan of secret diplomacy.
That is no reason why we should forsake Belgium now. The bald
fact remains that she has been trampled under foot by Germany,
that she is now invaded and held in subjection. It is England's duty
to fight on until the last invader is cleared from Belgian soil."
I give you full credit for honesty in this sentiment. Your aim
is generous ; but you have chosen futile means. You wish to avenge
Belgium by force of arms. It cannot be done.
Suppose you are successful ; that you drive back the Germans,
yard by yard, to their own territory. What does that mean for
Belgium? Merely a second devastation more terrible than the first.
Bv again making Belgium the world's battlefield, you will scorch
her bare. There is a better w^ay out. Why should Germany care
to retain Belgian territory? Only as a weapon against yon. "Ant-
werp is a i)istol pointed at the heart of England." Strategically
Belgium has \alue ; politically and financially she would be a liabil-
ity. As soon as you convince the Germans that England is not per-
petrating a huge aggression to destroy her, Belgium will be evacu-
ated without cost to the Belgians ; not before. I agree that no settle-
ment of this conflict can be satisfactory which does not restore Bel-
gium's independence and make her such measure of reparation as
may be possible. Ijut in that reparation you have a share to pay as
well as Germany.
Let us, in the name of decency, drop this twaddle about the
rights of small nationalities. Consider your allies. You stood calmly
aside when Russia throttled Finland, and when she crushed Persian
independence with atrocities more gruesome than the alleged Ger-
man atrocities. You applauded Japan in violating China's neutral-
ity to march on Kiao Chou. Your Foreign Office actively supported
France when she tore up the public law of Europe as embodied in
the Act of Algeciras and subjected Morocco to military terrorism
and financial strangulation. Do you insist on one moral code for
your enemies and approve an opposite for your friends? Your
own record in Ireland should close your lips against pious plati-
tudes about small nations. You did not enter this war to protect
Belgium. You will never render her efifective service until you are
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prepared to bargain concessions or colonies to secure her interests.
That, apparently, you are not ready to do.
What are you fighting for? Not Belgium!
III.
Possibly you are in this war to safeguard France. La belle
France ! You could not bear to see your closest friend crushed to
earth. If that is your motive it is a laudable one. The whole world
holds France precious.
You will admit, however, that this deep affection is rather a
sudden attachment. For centuries the French and British peoples
fought and snarled at one another. You hated France when France
was strong. Even within the last quarter century there were three
occasions when you stood on the brink of war with her,—over Siam,
West Africa, and the Nile Valley (Fashoda). But in 1904 your For-
eign Ofifice reached a general agreement with France on all outstand-
ing disputes. In 1906 it came to an understanding with Russia, and so
the Entente Cordiale was formed. From that day on the peace of
Europe was never safe. While the Triple Alliance was the most
powerful military force in Europe the dogs were chained, but when
a stronger combination (presumably) arose, the politics of Europe
steadily underwent a sinister transformation. Let us see what
happened.
The British Foreign Ofifice definitely abandoned Salisbury's
policy of a Concert for a system of rival military groups. The
Entente did not confine itself to a defensive league against a pos-
sible attack, but began openly or clandestinely to balk and bully and
injure its rivals in time of peace. Sir Edward Grey at once signed
a general Anglo-French declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco,
in which the French government avered that it had no intention "of
altering the political status of Morocco." This was followed by the
publication of a Franco-Spanish declaration of similar tenor. At
the same time that these public declarations of good faith appeared
Sir Edward Grey entered into secret agreements with France and
Spain which provided for the partition of Morocco between the two
latter countries and rendered the integrity of the Moorish kingdom
a sham.'' Germany had vast economic interests in Morocco. What
became of them? They were wrested from her. Germany was
robbed, underhandedly, and furthermore was humiliated, insulted,
® The Moroccan intrigue served more than anything else to embitter Anglo-
German relations, and helped to usher in the present war. The authority for
the statements in the text is to be found in Morocco in Diplomacy by E. D.
Morel, first published in London in 1912, and reissued as Ten Years of Secret
Diplomacy in 1915. Mr. Morel presents the history of the affair with such a
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slapped in the face. Morocco, whose independence was guaranteed
not only by the public declarations of 1904, but also by the interna-
tional Act of Algeciras of 1906, signed by all the powers, was ruth-
lessly reduced to a French dependency. Morocco in time of "peace"
was treated worse than Belgium in time of war.
To all this Germany did not submit without a protest. She
intervened twice, once at Tangier in the person of the Emperor,
and again at Agidir with the Panther. In these interventions she
was entirely within her rights, and in accord with what Mr. Morel
calls "the fundamental legality of her attitude." And both times
Europe nearly plunged into war because Britain interfered to back
up France in an aggression where she was morally and legally
wrong. In both instances, mind you, your Foreign Ofifice did not
interfere with merely diplomatic weapons, but with the threat of the
whole military and naval forces of Great Britain,—offered, in the
event of a Franco-German rupture, to mobilize the fleet, seize the
Kiel canal and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. These facts
were laid bare in the Lausanne disclosures of 1905 and the Faber
revelations of 1911. One immediate effect was to leave the whole
German nation rocking and seething with indignation, and to con-
vince Germany that England would precipitate a European war on
the first pretext.
In the end Germany lost all of her interests in Morocco, though
a slice of land in the interior of the French Congo was thrown to
her as a sop. The secret clauses of the 1904 Declarations finally
were revealed in Le Temps and Le Matin, November, 1911. But
Germany had wind of them as early as October, 1904. Says Mr.
Morel (remember that he wrote in 1912) : "Thenceforth dated the
situation which for more than seven years has poisoned the whole
European atmosphere, embroiled British, French, German, and
Spanish relations, and placed an enormous and constantly growing
burden of added expenditure upon the peoples of those countries.
Thenceforth dated the situation which Sir Edward Grey, instead of
seeking to improve by orienting his policy after Algeciras in a more
friendly spirit toward Germany—retaining what was good but re-
jecting what was bad in the policy of his predecessor—has aggra-
vated and worsened to such a degree that only yesterday we escaped
a general conflagration. Veritably the process of being a party to
the stealing of another man's land brings with it its own Nemesis.
Unfortunately it is the people in whose name, but without whose
wealth of detailed proof, with such evident impartiality and with so genuine a
concern for the best interests of England and of Europe that I venture to state
no fair-minded man can read the book unconvinced.
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sanction, these things are done, who have to pay." And again : "I
understand that in the current jargon of diplomacy that sort of
thing is called 'high politics.' The plain man may be permitted to
dub it by one word only—dishonesty."
Yes, it was dishonest diplomacy, just as it was dishonest states-
manship in 1914 to deny in the House of Commons that the country
was pledged to France, and then to reveal, after war actually had
broken out, secret obligations of honor. England's naval and mili-
tary power has been mortgaged to France in case of a war with
Germany for the last ten years, unconditionally, and without ref-
erence, apparently, to the nature of the quarrel and the crisis. It
was so in 1905, it was so in 1911, and it was so in August, 1914.
The British Foreign Office had become saturated with anti-German
feeling, with suspicion and unfairness. This anti-German cabal,
typified by such men as Tyrrell, Nicholson and Bertie, did all it
could to stultify international good-will, and, through the press, to
prejudice and embitter public opinion. Sir Edward Grey worked
hand and glove with this cabal, although his anti-Germanism seems
to have been diluted with a pale pacifism which made him shudder,
at the last moment, on the edge of that catastrophe he had done so
much to make inevitable. The culpability of Britain is no less be-
cause these machinations were carried on behind the scenes and
without the overt sanction of the British people. In foreign affairs
the Foreign Office was Britain. And when the great test came it
was able to carry the country into war.
For France, then, are you fighting? For the France of gaiety,
of beauty, of philosophy? What did your diplomatic intriguers
care for the ideal France? They were playing a high and baleful
game, the game of the Balance of Power, in which Germany was
to be outmatched, the game of the ring-fence. England's creation
of the Entente, or rather the way she manipulated her influence
after it was accomplished, had an evil influence on the politics of
both her allies. In Russia the loans of British gold strengthened
a weakening bureaucracy ; the decline of the Duma dates from that
sinister aid.'^ In France it caused the fires of La Revanche to burn
brighter. It gave political power to the French Colonial Party and
threw the Republic into the hands of adventurers. It thwarted
every movement toward a Franco-German rap/^rochemeiit, inspiring,
for example, those influences which brought about the overthrow
of Caillaux. Was ever game more stupid, or in the end more
' See Persia, Finland, and our Russian Alliance, pamphlet of the Indepen-
dent Labour Party.
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disastrous? As it was diplomacy without honesty, so it was states-
manship without enhghtenment. What price Britain pays we al-
ready begin to see. It served directly and needlessly to undermine
what is one of the greatest interests of true statesmanship, the peace
of the world.
And mark you ! This France to which you so effectively allied
yourself was bound by the strongest of agreements to Russia. Her
war policy was part and parcel of Russia's policy. Why is France
now at war? Is it because she was wantonly invaded by Germany,
or because she is fulfilling her pledges to Russia? Let there be no
mistake in this matter. France came into the struggle automat-
ically as Russia's ally. Though there was some silly pose at the
beginning—what Americans would call "a grandstand play"—about
withdrawing ten kilometers behind the frontier, there never was any
doubt as to France's action. "France is resolved to fulfil all the
obligations of her alliance."^ Yet this quarrel was at first a Russian
affair. It was a dispute over the Balkans between Servia and Rus-
sia on one side and Austria and Germany on the other. Let me
quote another Englishman. G. Lowes Dickinson says :^ "So far as
Russia is concerned, I believe Germany to be on the defensive."
Well, if that is so, then Germany is on the defensive against the
world. The nations had strung themselves on a single cord, the
handle to which was the Franco-Russian Alliance. When Russia
jerked that handle, the nations were all pulled in,—France, Great
Britain, Belgium. France was a link
;
you are really the ally of Russia.
To be the ally of unregenerate, medieval Russia is a national
infamy. But you cannot see that.
The attitude of cultivated Englishmen toward Russia illustrates
how the partisanship of war warps the mind. At one time you
understood the real Russia and dreaded and abhorred that reign of
the Secret Police called its government. But an ally can do no
wrong. So far as possible Englishmen now mentally turn their
backs on Russia, and whenever they are forced to look at her they put
on rose-colored spectacles lest they see the truth. Arnold Bennett,
in one of the most unsportsmanlike defenses^" of British diplomacy
which has been published, declares that so far as England is con-
cerned, Russia is an accident. An accident! An accident composed of
170,000.000 people which increases at the rate of 3,000,000 a year,
' Statement of Viviani to the French ambassadors at St. Petersburg and
London, July 30, 1914. French Yellow Book, No. 101.
' The War and the IVay Out, p. 16.
"
"Liberty."
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with all those millions conscripted and marshalled by the most soul-
less, oppressive, unscrupulous autocracy in the world ! For the
Germans this vast Tatar nation is no accident. "We in the West,"
as Marcel Sembat pointed out some months before he entered the
French Cabinet, "have never quite realized how Germans regard
Russia. For us she is a safely distant power. We can afford to
think of her novels and her music. We can personify her as a
nation which produced Tolstoy and Kropotkin.^^ We know her
through her exiles. For the Germans she is the semi-barbarous
neighbor across the frontier, with the population which is eighty
per cent illiterate, and those Cossacks whose name still recalls the
devastations of the Seven Years War."^- Yet the truth about Russia
is not hard to ascertain. Since the war started all the forces of
reaction have been strengthened. The labor leaders, every liberal
element, have been terrorized ; the Jews, already ground under heel,
have been subjected to new and horrible indignities ; all constitu-
tional rights in Finland have been stamped out. The Duma has
been prorogued and silenced. Russia uses the support of her liberal
allies to slump further back into despotism. This war is the great
catastrophe; it overshadows all else. But the next greatest crime
against civilization is the fact that the three greatest cultural nations
of the West, England, Germany and France, instead of standing
shoulder to shoulder against the Asiatic powers, are tearing at each
other's vitals, with two of the three arrayed against the third at the
behest and in the interest of this unspeakable bureaucracy. Who is
responsible for this irrational, this unholy alliance? I leave the
answer to you.
IV.
"But away with all this talk of policies and politics," you cry.
"Let us get down to the fundamental issue, Germany herself. Why
are we at war ? Look at our foe for your answer ! We could not
abide a world forever overawed by this menace of Prussianism!
These barbarians ! These veritable Huns ! This modern Attila
!
This perverted nation of militarists ! This incarnate blood-lust and
egotism ! This—
"
Save your vocabulary. We have heard more than enough of
vituperation within the past year. I know that you, the better class
of Englishmen—and that is the only sort I am addressing—have had
no part in the shameless and cowardly abuse of Germans which
has filled your press during the war period. Still it is true, I believe,
" Kropotkin by all means. See his The Terror in Russia, 1909.
" H. N. Brailsford in The New Republic, July 24, 1915.
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that your conception of Germany is compounded in part of fictions.
How could it be otherwise? For a decade certain sections of British
opinion have made it their interest to slander and misrepresent your
great Teutonic neighbor. Within the last months these defamers
have used their blackest colors ; they do not picture a people at all,
but a grotesque caricature of something which started out to be
superhuman and ended in being inhuman. Out of the fog of war
they have fashioned a bogy, a monster which bears no more resem-
blance to the Germany across the North Sea than does an image
of Moloch to a man. All Englishmen appear to share, in greater or
less degree, this bogy-belief.
To refute each canard, to strip bare and expose each fiction,
would be impossible. But some categorical statements should be
made. Germans are not inhuman brutes, delighting in atrocities
;
in the conduct of this war they have shown themselves no more
cruel and brutal than the French, and far less so than the Russians
and your brown and black native troops. The Teuton is not by
nature bestial, bloodthirsty, or merciless any more than is the
Briton or any other civilized European, and he yields to the evil
passions of war no more readily. Germanic civilization is not in-
ferior to French or English or Italian civilization, though different
on the contrary it might well be maintained that the only nation
which has abolished poverty, the one whose educational system is
the best in the world, whose municipal governments are models,
which outstrips all nations in scientific and industrial energy, shows
distinct elements of superiority. The Germans are not mad with
military ambition, nor bent on any career of world conquest, deter-
mined to impose the German language and German institutions on
unwilling peoples. They asked for a place in the sun. But a place in
the sun is not the whole earth.
Come, let us be reasonable. In plain justice you must admire
the Germans, even though you do not love them. If Anglo-Saxon
civilization is musk in your nostrils, Teutonic civilization cannot be
stench. In the arts of peace the Germans challenge emulation. In
war they are the astonishment of all history. No other people could
have withstood so overwhelming a coalition. Not only in a military
and technical manner are they proving their strength, but in a moral
and intellectual way too. In England you have an oppressive cen-
sorship ; and you have lost for the time being many of your consti-
tutional rights. In Germany the censorship confines itself to its
proper duty of suppressing military information ; there the most
unfriendly news is published, including the daily British and French
A QUESTION FOR ENGLAND. 727
war bulletins ; in any German city one may read the current English
and French newspapers, and buy the books and pamphlets written
to expose German guilt. Is it so with you ? Or in Russia or France ?
Does this mean anything except that the German people, alone
among the belligerents, are allowed freely to face the truth? And
there are Englishmen who still speak of this as the Kaiser's war,
or a Junkers' war!
For the Germans this is a people's war, in the fullest sense of
the term. The great spiritual fact of the struggle is this flaming,
unbroken conviction of the German people that they are right.
Though your statesmen may have been successful with Russia,
France and Italy, they have done very badly with Germany. They
have not left a single German, high or low, with the smallest doubt
that Britain engineered a conspiracy to destroy its rival. The ex-
planation is simple. The Germans look to history, remote and
recent. Englishmen work themselves into a great consternation
over what Prussian militarism is going to do ; and they try to
frighten neutrals with pen-pictures of its future depredations But
Germans point to the actual performances of Prussian militarism, and
contrast them with the concrete performances of British imperialism.
They point out, for example, that this terrible menace of Prus-
sianism, to which you impute such evil designs, has kept the peace
in Europe since 1870; that it never seized a favorable opportunity
to precipitate war, and neglected to attack Russia when crippled
by Japan, France during the Dreyfus affair, England when the Boers
disclosed her weakness. They recall that the German government,
in the face of a hostile press at home, sacrificed German interests
in Morocco in order to avoid a European conflagration. And they
ask, has British imperialism ever refrained from aggression when
its "interests" were involved? England has formed coalitions suc-
cessively against Spain, Holland and France ; she has swept from
the sea every fleet which dared to rival her own. Her recent attitude
toward Germany has been of a piece with this historic policy ; the
eft"orts of her statesmen have aimed consistently at the enfeeblement
and the isolation of Germany.
One of the British prophets of this war was Professor Cramb.
In his book he wrote: "'France,' said Bismarck in September, 1870,
'must be paralyzed ; for she will never forgive us our victories.' And
in the same spirit Treitschke avers : England will never forgive us
our strength. And not without justice he delineates English policy
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as aimed con-
sistently at the repression of Prussia."
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What are you fighting for?
Here is your answer. The repression of Prussia! Since Ger-
many became a power, and particularly since she began to build a
navy, she aroused increasing dislike and distrust amongst you. In
1897 the Saturday Review announced the slogan Germaniam esse
delcndam, and that program has been steadily backed by a power-
ful element of British opinion. Your statesmen have pursued the
old, unimaginative politics of annoyances and curbs ; they have done
their utmost to balk every German attempt at expansion in Africa
or in Asia, and sometimes their interference has been nothing short
of wantonly malicious, as in the instances of Morocco and of the
Bagdad Railway. Militarism in Germany? Of course there is
militarism there, and some of its aspects are not bright. But why
not? British policy for a decade and more has done all in its power
to create a military temper in Germany, to throw her into the hands
of the war party, and to lash into being that tigerish ferocity with
which she now fights you. Commercial jealousy and irritation in
manufacturing circles, blended with imperialistic voracity and cer-
tain calculations (or miscalculations) of high politics, have led
Great Britain into an anti-German policy and an anti-German war.
You will resent this answer to our question. To declare that
England is fighting, not for Belgium, not for France, not for the
sanctity of treaties or human rights, but merely for selfish imperial-
istic reasons, and rather ill-conceived reasons at that, strikes you,
I am sure, as grossly distorted. When you look into your own souls
you find no such sordid motives. You find only an intense love of
England and of England's honor, and a sense of British quality
and worth. I know how you feel and I know that the things you
cherish are realities. But these noble realities, I submit, have very
little to do with the beginning of this war, or its end.
And you could see this too, were you able, even for one brief
hour, to throw yourselves into complete sympathy with your oppo-
nents, and look at the world through their eyes. Had you attempted
any such sympathetic understanding of Germany two years ago,
this war, I am convinced, never would have happened. You would
have seen that the very future existence of Germany depends on
her overseas markets, and that she must be able to guard these at
all costs. As it is, you have been applying one logic to Germany
and another to England. You have looked upon the German navy
as an impertinence and a threat, even though the growth of the
German navy has been accompanied by a constant demand for the
freedom of the seas (i. e., the abolition of the capture of private
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property at sea). But you have never been able to see that the British
navy, nearly twice as large, is a threat (to Germany and possibly to
others) especially when accompanied by a stubborn and effective
refusal to have the seas neutralized. You could denounce colonial
greed in Germany, and stand ready to fight her if she acquired an
African colony, or a naval base in the Atlantic ; but British expan-
sion, though unlimited, seemed justified, no matter at whose ex-
pense ; and you could applaud when Bonar Law announced in July,
1915, that the Entente Allies had torn from the Teutons 450,000
square miles of colonial possessions. What is meat for you, you
declare to be poison for Germany. You tried, in your supremacy,
to enforce a dictation on others to which you would not submit for
a moment. The worst you can properly say of Germany is that
she challenged that supremacy, and that she may yet force you to
treat her as an equal.
The vital question remains: What of the future? The past is
past ; it must bury its dead. To fix the blame, to point the accusing
finger, to try to anticipate the condemnation of history, is in itself
a fruitless task. After all, the stupidest people in the world are they
who—on whichever side—wish to "punish" some one for this war,
—this ultimate calamity in which each belligerent shares a portion
of the guilt. What strikes one in this gigantic struggle between the
British and German nations is not so much its wickedness and its
fierceness, as its needlessness, its utter irrationality. Germany is,
as I said before, your natural ally ; there are a thousand valid rea-
sons for friendship to one valid reason for hostility. Is it too late
to hope for a reconciliation between these two great peoples which
are so alike in their virtues, however much they may differ in their
faults? I think you begin to see what a task you have on your
hands in seeking to humble a nation so strong and so indignant as
Germany. However the war results, neither Germany nor England
can be annihilated. And that is well, for there is room for both in
the world. The highest ideal of international development is not a
level uniformity, but many divergent cultures, each intensifying its
own peculiar merits. Will it be impossible for the English to put
their pride—even though it turn out to be a wounded pride—behind
them, and make that great effort toward a sympathetic understanding
of Germany which should have been made long ago ? We may hope
that the effort can be made, for in the final restoration of Anglo-
German friendship lies one of the world's best hopes, and the
strongest guarantee of future peace.
